Introduction
The achievement of an integrated financial market has been a long-term objective of the European Union (EU). Against this background, there is a considerable debate on the degree of coordination of supervision . However, the debate remained dominated by a divergences in academic and policy circles between, on the one hand, light forms of coordination among national supervisors, and on the other, more centralized approaches. 2 Policy makers´ recommendations for intensified coordination among supervisors and harmonization of their regulatory frameworks have specific implications for the EU. As of end of 2007, there were 46 banking groups with holdings of almost 70% of total banking assets in the EU. These cross-border banks operate in a multi-jurisdictional environment and do need to interact with multiple national supervisors. Against this background of increasing financial integration, there is a growing need to (re)assess the efficiency and effectiveness of any framework for banking regulation and supervision. This paper is motivated by the finding that in the debate about supervisory coordination/centralization in the EU, thus far little attention has been paid to the convergence of supervisory architectures in member countries. The economic profession has mainly focused on the need to develop common regulatory frameworks (Nieto and Peñalosa, 2004, Lastra, 2006) and integrated financial oversight (Prati and Schinasi,1999; Goodhart, 2000; Holthausen and Ronde, 2005; Mayes, Nieto and Wall, 2008 among others) ., This bias towards one aspect of supervisory coordination seems unjustified because other aspects may have an impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of any future European supervisory structurewhether it is a centralized or a decentralized one-and therefore deserve proper attention. The paper claims that any reform of the supervisory structure at the European level should benefit from the recent and current trends in countries' revealed preferences with respect to the institutional architecture.
To stimulate to this debate, this paper reviews current trends in reforms of the supervisory architecture in EU countries. While there is no such thing as an optimal supervisory structure, this review will nonetheless help us in identifying common preferences among the 27 EU countries (EU 27) that could be exploited in reforms at the European level. More importantly, it will allow us to analyze the implications of different structures for the governance of supervision at the EU level.
It is outside the scope of this paper to express a preference between these two options-or any other option. The aim is simply to discuss implications in terms of national architectures 
Convergence in Supervisory Architectures
The architectures of financial supervision has been going through a deep evolution on all fronts worldwide and the EU has not been an exception. Only 15 years ago, the issue of financial supervisory architecture was considered irrelevant. The fact that only banking systems were subject to robust supervision made several of the current organizational questions meaningless. In such context, the supervisory design was either considered deterministic (i.e., an exogenous variable), or accidental (i.e., a completely random variable). 4 Since then, financial market development, resulting in the growing importance of insurance, securities and pension fund sectors, has made supervision of a growing number of nonbank financial intermediaries, as well as the investor protection dimension of supervision, highly relevant.
As a result of these changes, financial supervisory architectures are now less uniform than in the past.
In some countries the architecture still reflects the classic sectoral model, with separate supervisors for banking, securities and insurance (e.g. France, Spain and Italy). The dynamic character of these reforms is highlighted by the fact that the present financial crisis is leading to a reassessment of the recent reforms (e.g. the debate in the United Kingdom following the Northern Rock debacle as well as the current discussion of the effectiveness of the supervisory architecture in Germany and Austria that has already completed its new reform at the time of writing ), or has opened the debate in those countries that did not participate in the previous round of reforms (e.g. the United States).
The model of supervisory architecture and its degree of consolidation are two distinctive dimensions of the reform, although they can be correlated. In fact the same model of financial supervision can be designed with different degrees of supervisory consolidation. The single supervisory model, where the supervision of banking, securities and insurance markets is completely integrated, is based on just one control authority; but some powers (i.e. information gathering on the condition of financial intermediaries) can be shared with other authorities (typically the central bank). In the (classic) specialized (sectoral) model, with separate supervisors for banks, securities and insurance, at least three separate supervisors are established and more than one agency can supervise the same sector (as is the case in the US Table   1 ). This index was created through an analysis of which and how many authorities are empowered to supervise the three traditional sectors of financial activity: banking, securities markets and insurance. Table 1 ). Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution of the CBFA Index. Again a polarization holds: In the majority of countries in the EU-27 (13) the central bank is not the main bank supervisor (Index equal to 1), while just in three countries (Czech Table 1 . 7 There are five qualitative characteristics of supervisory regimes that we decided not to consider in constructing this index. Firstly, we did not consider the legal nature -public or private -of the supervisory agencies nor their relationship to the political system (degree of independence, level of accountability). Secondly, we excluded from this analysis the authority in charge of competition and market regulation. Since such an agency exists in all EU 27 countries, it was left out for the purposes of this analysis. We also did not include the agency in charge of the management of the deposit insurance schemes. In general, we consider only the three traditional sectors (banking, securities and insurance markets) that have been the subject of supervision. Finally, the financial authorities may perform different functions in the regulatory as well as in the supervisory area. However, at this first stage of the institutional analysis, we prefer to consider only the number of the agencies involved in the supervisory activities.
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Republic, Ireland and Slovakia) the central bank is monopolistic in the overall financial supervision (Index equal to 4).
Considering both indices jointly for the EU 27 countries (Figure 4 ), the analysis shows that also the two most frequent regimes are polarised: on the one hand, Unified Supervisor regime (8 countries 10 in red) ; on the other, Central Dominated Multiple Supervisors regime (7 countries 11 in yellow) . The Figure seems to depict a trade off in the EU contest between supervision unification and central bank involvement, with three outliers (Czech Republic, Ireland and Slovakia in green).
. Conclusion
The However, whatever the explanation of the supervisory architecture is, it is evident that the degree of convergence among the EU countries is low. Furthermore, it has been claimed that no "superior" model of supervision exists (Schoenmaker 2003 , Quintyn et al., 2007 . Different contributions (Abrams and Taylor, 2002; Arnone and Gambini, 2007; Fleming, Lewellyn and Carmichael, 2004; Cihak and Podpiera, 2007a, and 2007b) claim that there are no strong theoretical arguments in favour of any particular architecture of financial supervision, given that it is possible to provide advantages and disadvantages of each model.
Even though there is no best practice with respect to the supervisory architecture, the trends in the EU nonetheless could have some policy implications. The existence of a polarized world in the field of the supervisory architectures is likely to produce competition between the two models and therefore the convergence process among countries will be more difficult, as well as the potential political agreement on centralization, given the absence of a common benchmark.
Moreover, there could be interaction between the degree of consolidation at the national level and the 
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Note: the axes represent the two indexes, while the diameter represents the number of countries for each regime.
Table 1 The institutional indicators FSU INDEX
The index was built on the following scale: 7 = Single authority for all three sectors (total number of supervisors=1); 5 = Single authority for the banking sector and securities markets (total number of supervisors=2); 3 = Single authority for the insurance sector and the securities markets, or for the insurance sector and the banking sector (total number of supervisors=2); 1 = Specialized authority for each sector (total number of supervisors=3).
We assigned a value of 5 to the single supervisor for the banking sector and securities markets because of the predominant importance of banking intermediation and securities markets over insurance in every national financial industry. It also interesting to note that, in the group of integrated supervisory agency countries, there seems to be a higher degree of integration between banking and securities supervision than between banking and insurance supervision ; therefore, the degree of concentration of powers, ceteris paribus, is greater. These observations do not, however, weigh another qualitative characteristic: There are countries in which one sector is supervised by more than one authority. It is likely that the degree of concentration rises when there are two authorities in a given sector, one of which has other powers in a second sector. On the other hand, the degree of concentration falls when there are two authorities in a given sector, neither of which has other powers in a second sector. It would therefore seem advisable to include these aspects in evaluating the various national supervisory structures by modifying the index as follows: adding 1 if there is at least one sector in the country with two authorities, and one of these authorities is also responsible for at least one other sector; subtracting 1 if there is at least one sector in the country with two authorities assigned to supervision, but neither of these authorities has responsibility for another sector; 0 elsewhere.
CBFA INDEX
For each country, and given the three traditional financial sectors (banking, securities and insurance), the CBFA index is equal to: 1 if the central bank is not assigned the main responsibility for banking supervision; 2 if the central bank has the main (or sole) responsibility for banking supervision; 3 if the central bank has responsibility in any two sectors; 4 if the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors (In evaluating the role of the central bank in banking supervision, we considered the fact that, whatever the supervision regime, the central bank has responsibility in pursuing macro financial stability. Note that the countries of the Euro area are not monetary authorities. Therefore, we chose the relative role of the central bank as a rule of thumb: we assigned a greater value (2 instead of 1) if the central bank is the sole or the main authority responsible for banking supervision.
Source: Masciandaro 2007
